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In the United States, the explicit representation of workforce interests in
strategic decision-making processes of corporations is rare. Participation
in strategic decisions—those that aﬀect the basic direction of the com-
pany—is unusual even when workforce interests are represented collec-
tively through unions. In this chapter, we consider U.S. labor-management
experiments with two institutions through which strategic participation 
for unions might be realized: negotiated union-management partnership
agreements and union representation on corporate boards.
Legal mandates for works councils and workforce representation on
corporate boards of directors (or “codetermination”) are characteristic of
many European countries. In contrast, there are no legal structures that
require American ﬁrms to engage workers in participation at either the
workplace or the corporate board. Strategic participation for U.S. unions
has emerged from an ad hoc set of private initiatives. In this chapter, we ex-
amine these initiatives. We begin by considering the problem of corporate
governance and reviewing the rationale for strategic partnerships. The next
section discusses the prevalence of partnerships in the United States. The
following sections report on negotiated partnerships and on union in-
volvement in corporate boards of directors. We discuss the challenges and
dilemmas unions face in seeking strategic partnerships and conclude with
observations on public policy.
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Corporate governance is generally understood to refer to the legal and
organizational structures that govern the relationship between corporate
executives and the shareholders that are the ultimate owners of the com-
pany. Through corporate governance structures, ﬁrms make decisions
about investments in plant and equipment, levels of staﬀ and deployment
of workers, location of operations, the allocation of resources, and the dis-
tribution of earnings. In theories of the ﬁrm that dominate U.S. legal and
economic discourse, the purpose of corporate governance structures is to
align the interests of corporate executives with those of the shareholders
and to assure that managers act in shareholders’ best interests (Shleifer and
Vishny 1997). Shareholders have legally recognized rights to be repre-
sented on corporate boards of directors and to have their assets protected
from misuse or misappropriation by the careless or opportunistic behavior
of managers.
Shareholder-focused conceptions of the ﬁrm and their supporting legal
structures sharply diﬀerentiate decision-making managers from workers
who do not make decisions. Some states have allowed directors to consider
the interests of workers and other stakeholders (Orts 1992), but most
American corporate boards of directors owe a ﬁduciary responsibility to
the companies’ shareholders. Workers typically have no legally guaranteed
rights to participation in corporate governance structures or to have their
interests taken into account when strategic decisions are made. Share-
holder-based theories reduce the relationship between owners and workers
to an employment contract that speciﬁes the wage–work eﬀort bargain.
Contemporary practice, however, suggests that eﬀective management
requires more than the speciﬁcation of this bargain because workers also
make important decisions about the ways in which work gets done. Work-
ers’ engagement in decision making began on a reasonably large scale in
the United States with Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs in the 1970s
(Appelbaum and Batt 1994). Subsequent competitive pressures and tech-
nological developments led ﬁrms to adopt self-directed work teams and an
array of other practices that facilitated worker participation in operational
decisions at work sites. These practices began slowly in the 1980s and be-
came increasingly prevalent in the 1990s (Lawler, Ledford, and Mohrman
1989; Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford 1992; Osterman 1994; Lawler, Mohr-
man, and Ledford 1995; Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce 1998; Osterman
2000).
At the operational level, the beneﬁts of involvement typically outweigh
costs associated with joint decision making. Empirical evidence demon-
strates improvements in productivity, quality, delivery times, and even ﬁ-
nancial performance as a result of worker participation in operational de-
cisions of the enterprise (Katz, Kochan, and Weber 1985; MacDuﬃe 1995;
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2000). (Becker and Gerhart [1996], Ichniowski et al. [1996], and Baker
[1999] also review the evidence.) These studies suggest that corporate man-
agement has an interest in implementing what have been termed “high-
performance work systems.” Workers in high-performance work systems
also generally ﬁnd that their jobs are more intrinsically satisfying and re-
warding—more challenging and able to make better use of their skills (Ap-
pelbaum et al. 2000).
At decision-making levels above that of the day-to-day workplace,
however, participation and partnership typically remain the prerogative 
of management. Managers have resisted calls for joint decision-making
forums for decisions that might require downsizing, divesting of parts or
whole divisions, or shifting operations to new locations or to other (often
nonunion) subsidiaries, for example. Shareholders, similarly, may oppose
decision-making processes that make it more diﬃcult for owners to cap-
ture rents associated with innovations in technology, work systems, prod-
ucts, or services. Managerial opposition to strategic participation by
unions has often been strident (for an example, see Loughran 1985).
Traditional collective bargaining by unions, within the existing frame-
work of labor law, provides some constraints on managerial discretion.
Unions have legally protected rights to negotiate over the eﬀects of strate-
gic decisions (though not the decisions themselves), and collective bar-
gaining creates governance structures within ﬁrms that aﬀect the distribu-
tion of resources, including the extent to which the ﬁrm’s revenue is shared
with the workforce and the ways in which pay is allocated across workers.
Unions may also negotiate to establish grievance procedures that provide
a voice mechanism for workers who feel they have been treated unfairly by
management and for job rules and employment security arrangements that
limit employers’ ability to hire and ﬁre at will.
Union leaders have been historically reluctant to involve themselves any
more deeply in strategic decision making than is called for under tradi-
tional collective bargaining. Such involvement might require them to as-
sume responsibility for the performance of the company or to participate
in business decisions that may have disparate eﬀects on diﬀerent groups of
union members, and labor leaders have not embraced such a role. Thomas
Donahue, then American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Or-
ganization (AFL-CIO) secretary-treasurer, summarized the traditional
viewpoint in a 1976 speech:
Because American unions have won equality at the bargaining table, we
have not sought it in corporate boardrooms. We do not seek to be a part-
ner in management—to be, most likely, the junior partner in success and
the senior partner in failure. We do not want to blur in any way the dis-
tinctions between the respective roles of management and labor in the
plant. We guard our independence ﬁercely—independent of govern-
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ment.
8.2.1 The Rationale for Strategic Partnerships
Even as new work practices diﬀused over the 1980s and 1990s, some
union leaders came to believe that neither employee involvement nor col-
lective bargaining provided unions with the means to deal with the turbu-
lence associated with increasingly mobile capital, global competition, and
corporate restructuring. For example, some evidence on the diﬀusion of
new work practices suggests that such practices were not typically accom-
panied by provisions for employment security (Osterman 1994) and that
ﬁrms that adopted them were, in fact, more likely than others to lay oﬀ
workers in the 1990s (Osterman 2000).
Workers tended to be favorably inclined toward new work systems, but
their responses were less enthusiastic when reforms were coupled with cor-
porate strategies that made jobs more precarious rather than more secure
(Hunter, MacDuﬃe, and Doucet 2002). Union leaders observe that down-
sizing and restructuring threatened their members even as the work prac-
tices they had negotiated were delivering higher performance. These
threats prompted more vigorous interest representation through collective
bargaining and more skeptical attitudes toward high-performance work
systems.
Some unions also began to seek venues for engaging the strategic deci-
sions themselves, looking for inﬂuence over the direction of the business,
the allocation of resources, and the distribution of revenues, and for access
to the ﬁnancial information and business records upon which such deci-
sions were based. While risky, these strategic partnerships may prove to be
popular with union members: the Workplace Representation and Partici-
pation Survey (Freeman and Rogers 1999) provides evidence that union
members would support such institutions. Past opposition to such in-
volvement may also have been overstated; an earlier survey by Fatehi-
Sadeh and Saﬁzadeh (1986), for example, showed that Illinois United Auto
Workers (UAW) and AFL-CIO oﬃcials were favorably inclined toward
strategic engagement.
Strategic partnership not only commands some support among workers
but also has an underlying economic rationale. Workers who invest in ﬁrm-
speciﬁc skills—skills that do not transfer easily to other jobs—have a
vested interest in the long-term performance of the ﬁrm that employs
them. This rationale is intensiﬁed in the current competitive environment,
which features both continued downsizing and increasing use of high-
performance work practices; these practices require that workers make
large investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills (Appelbaum and Berg 2000). As
with investments by shareholders in ﬁrm-speciﬁc physical capital, the re-
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as the company employs these skills to generate revenue. Should strategic
considerations lead companies to lay oﬀ workers before they have the
chance to recover the value of their investments in skills, U.S. workers, un-
like their counterparts in many European countries, have no legally en-
forceable means to protect their investments. A role for unions in these de-
cisions may therefore enhance the credibility of commitments made by
managers, who themselves may be employed for relatively short periods
and who may have incentives focused heavily on short-term performance.
8.2.2 The Prevalence of Strategic Labor-Management Partnerships
Gray, Myers, and Myers’s (1999) review of the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics ﬁle on contemporary collective-bargaining agreements (those expir-
ing between September 1, 1997 and September 30, 2007 and covering more
than 1,000 employees) found that nearly 47 percent of U.S. collective-
bargaining agreements contained some form of “partnership.” In this
chapter, we focus on partnerships that include strategic engagement—ne-
gotiated agreements that provide the union with a voice in high-level deci-
sions and with some inﬂuence over the governance of the company. Strate-
gic partnerships enable unions to participate along with management in
ﬁnancial planning, in determining competitive strategy, and in decisions
governing investments, technology, and production processes.
Gray, Myers, and Myers (1999) located the strategic partnerships that we
discuss here at one end of a cooperation continuum, with modest arrange-
ments (such as language indicating the intention of the parties to cooper-
ate) at the other end, and provisions for employee involvement and infor-
mation sharing somewhere between. A review of the collective-bargaining
agreements showed that strategic partnerships were extremely rare: only 27
of 1,041 contracts contained provisions for what Gray, Myers, and Myers
termed “full partnership”; these contracts covered about 200,000 workers.
The history of some relatively high-proﬁle labor-management partner-
ships, such as the one that developed between Xerox and the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union ([ACTWU] now the Union of Needle-
trades, Industrial and Textile Employees [UNITE]), implies that strate-
gic partnerships might evolve from shop-ﬂoor cooperation as a result of a
sort of natural progression (see Appelbaum and Batt [1994] for an over-
view of this case). Gray, Myers, and Myers (1999) similarly suggest that
partnerships may progress from low levels of cooperation, through more
elaborate channels for employee involvement, to full strategic partner-
ship.
We used this premise as a starting point for a small-sample inquiry. In the
summer of 1999, we surveyed twenty-ﬁve researchers in management, hu-
man resources, and labor studies. Each had published studies examining
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four diﬀerent companies.1 Many of these studies were assessments, nega-
tive as well as positive, of “high-performance workplace” practices imple-
mented through negotiated agreements.
Our survey focused on the extent to which negotiated cooperation, or
lower-level partnerships, served as a precursor to subsequent involvement
of the union in strategic decisions. Because the researchers were well posi-
tioned to provide a perspective with a longitudinal element, we asked them
to describe the evolution of cooperation in the union-management rela-
tionship and the extent to which strategic partnership had developed,
emerged, or been negotiated.
We received usable responses from twelve researchers. Of these, ﬁve re-
searchers reported that the union-management partnerships they studied
led to no strategic participation for the union. At an information technol-
ogy manufacturing company, for example, a partnership formed between
corporate executives at company headquarters and the top levels of the
union resulted in no high-level joint decision making at the plant being
studied. Similarly, a telephone company that had negotiated more cooper-
ative work practices with its union “never approached [strategic involve-
ment],” according to the researcher who studied it.
Three researchers reported on companies and unions that negotiated co-
operative relations, but not strategic partnerships, with the relationship
blurring into discussions and consultation on strategic issues. The cooper-
ative relation between the local union and management at one auto plant,
for example, was described by a researcher as based on information shar-
ing on business and operational matters. However, the relationship was
never meant to be a strategic partnership. On the contrary, the researcher
reported that “both parties jealously guard their rights and their obliga-
tions to their respective constituencies.” This sort of partnership included
communication, trust, consultation, and advance notice of changes; there
was, however, no shared decision making or union involvement in deci-
sions relating to ﬁnancial planning, investments, pricing, competitive
strategies, or production processes.
Another researcher characterized an auto agreement similarly:
Dialogue is not the same as negotiation. Above all, it doesn’t authorize
any claim by the union to a legitimate place at the table....  I n  m y  opin-
ion, management has been savvy and consistent in its eﬀorts to promote
worker participation (and not merely symbolic participation) while at
the same time limiting the union to a fairly traditional role.
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1. The companies include GTE, NYNEX, NUMMI, AT&T, Lucent, NCR, Saturn,
Chrysler, US West, Pac Bell, GM Linden, Alcoa, Levi Strauss, Xerox, Harrison Radiator,
Ford, Chrysler Canada, US Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, and companies in semicon-
ductors, trucking, airlines, and steel that wished to remain unidentiﬁed.Here, the union was informed and consulted prior to implementation of
management decisions but rarely involved in joint decision making. For
example, the company had already decided to adopt participatory work-
place practices before it began any discussion with the union. It then in-
volved the workforce extensively in the implementation of these practices.
The remaining four researchers reported on full strategic labor-
management agreements that accompanied other kinds of cooperation at
ﬁve companies. Diﬀerences in the origins and evolution of these agree-
ments are instructive. In the steel industry, strategic participation was
driven by the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) national bargain-
ing agenda (discussed in more detail in the following). The agenda includes
a commitment to build strategic labor-management partnerships wherever
possible in order to gain increased control over company decision making.
Researchers reported that companies in the steel and aluminum industries
entered into strategic partnership agreements with the USWA because
they needed to introduce new workplace practices in order to meet height-
ened global competition. The companies sought to redesign work pro-
cesses, to increase discretionary eﬀort, and, by doing so, to improve oper-
ational performance at the plant level; this required union participation. In
practice, these partnerships have been implemented diﬀerently across
companies and even across plants in the same company.
Telecommunications researchers described a contrasting case. Compe-
tition from nonunion companies led one large company to enter into
strategic partnership with the Communication Workers of America (CWA).
The company wanted union support for favorable legislation and adminis-
trative rulings domestically as well as union help when it sought approval
to participate in a foreign telephone company. This, it believed, would help
the company compete and grow; the union supported these eﬀorts because
they were likely to result in more union jobs. The union made company
neutrality in union organizing drives and card check recognition for the
union key requirements for its participation in a strategic alliance at this
and other telecom companies. According to the researchers,
The striking aspect of the union security clauses is that while the union
began to demand [them] soon after divestiture, it met with limited suc-
cess until the companies began needing union support in the regulatory
arena....  T h e  union supported their eﬀorts in return for some guaran-
tees for union and job security....  T h e  union won the union security
clauses by linking regulatory and collective bargaining activities.
Researchers suggested, however, that while CWA is involved in an alliance
with the company about strategic issues, unlike the steelworkers, the union
does not necessarily see shared decision-making authority as a key piece of
its bargaining agenda.
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strategic labor-management partnerships are rare. Even in cases where la-
bor and management made commitments to cooperation at other levels,
strategic involvement was unusual and did not typically follow other kinds
of cooperation as part of an unfolding process. The survey suggested fur-
ther that where such partnerships exist, they need not necessarily have
evolved out of earlier experiences with negotiated cooperative relation-
ships. Rather, there are a variety of paths to strategic partnership. We turn
our attention to these paths next.
8.2.3 The Shape of Strategic Engagement: Negotiated Partnerships
Some union leaders and companies have established strategic partner-
ships through negotiation. In the following we consider in more detail the
content of these partnerships as well as the reasons that diﬀerent unions
and ﬁrms agreed to construct them. We do so with reference to four diﬀer-
ent partnerships, negotiated by unions in electrical contracting, telecom-
munications, steel, and manufacturing.
Two primary kinds of interests—company growth (or stability) and new
work practices—have brought companies and their workers’ unions to-
gether in strategic partnerships. In the following we consider examples of
each. First, as competitive pressures continue to intensify, companies and
unions may ﬁnd that they have a common interest in seeing the company
grow. Growth of the company and expansion of union jobs, when these are
mutually agreed upon goals, can be advanced by a partnership relation-
ship. The cooperation of the union can help management preserve or in-
crease market share, while the union sees involvement in defense or expan-
sion of market share as an opportunity to protect and promote union jobs.
Second, at many companies increased competition also leads managers
to introduce participatory management and high-performance workplace
practices. Strategic involvement can complement these practices. An active
union role in decisions about workplace practices provides workers with a
further voice and a forum for addressing the context in which the organi-
zation introduces new practices. Unions, like companies, have an interest
in the adoption of practices that contribute to organizational viability and
success. Mutual respect for both company and union goals can also be ad-
vanced by partnership relationships.
Cooperative Eﬀorts in the Electrical Construction Industry
Perhaps the longest standing labor-management joint relationship in the
United States is in the electrical contracting industry between the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) and the National Elec-
trical Contractors Association (NECA). Composed of an equal number 
of representatives from the IBEW and NECA, the Council on Industrial
Relations was established in 1920 as a judicial body to handle labor-
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submitted voluntarily, and all decisions are unanimous. The Council on In-
dustrial Relations attempts to keep the industry free of strikes, serves as
binding arbitrator for the industry, and meets to discuss safety and train-
ing matters. The NECA and the IBEW also jointly operate the National
Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee for the electrical industry.
This program was established in 1947 as the national coordinating arm for
apprenticeship training. With a budget of approximately $80 million a
year, it operates more than 300 local apprenticeship training programs as
well as in-service skill-improvement training for electricians.
Building on these experiences with joint programs, NECA and the
IBEW responded to competition from nonunion electrical contractors by
establishing the National Labor Management Cooperation Committee
(NLMCC) in 1995. In addition to more traditional functions, such as pro-
moting mutual-gains bargaining, the NLMCC functions as a strategic
partnership between the thousands of union electrical contractors associ-
ated with NECA and the IBEW, which represents more than 300,000 elec-
trical construction workers. About 4,200 electrical contractors are mem-
bers of NECA, and nearly 12,000 other union electrical contractors are
“signatory” contractors who have indicated that they would like to be cov-
ered by the NECA contract. The NLMCC is funded at one cent per per-
son-hour worked, or at about $3.5 million per year.
Five years ago, in the context of its “Blueprint for the 90s,” the NLMCC
developed a “market recovery program” to take back market share from the
vast number of small, nonunion contractors in the construction industry.
Local NECA and IBEW groups work together to administer surveys to de-
termine how much construction work is carried out by union contractors
and union workers and to develop programs for increasing the share of
union work; the NLMCC helps to ﬁnance and conduct the surveys.
The program also includes joint campaigns to increase the number of
apprentices, to create pride in the industry and union, and, especially, to
promote the advantages of using union contractors. The NECA and the
IBEW jointly advertise union contractors and jointly hire sales people to
market union contractors to builders and architects. Advertising empha-
sizes the skills and versatility of union electricians and the pride they take
in doing their jobs well. Quality Connection, an industry magazine pub-
lished by the NLMCC, also supports this eﬀort.
The IBEW described the market recovery program and the NLMCC as
successful partnerships, noting that the number of union apprentices in the
industry rose from 25,000 to 40,000 in the last half of the 1990s. Further, in
1987 only about 28 percent of the electrical construction market was
unionized. By 1999, according to IBEW, the market share of union con-
tractors had risen to 37 percent of workers in the electrical construction in-
dustry.
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Concerns over market share and jobs also drove unions to seek strategic
engagement in the telecommunications industry. One example comes from
AT&T, where the loss of monopoly protection in 1984 and the breakup of
the Bell System led to a dramatic decline in union jobs. AT&T eliminated
over 60 percent of its unionized workforce between 1984 and 1992, while
the regional Bell companies reduced the number of employees by about 30
percent through attrition (Batt, Katz, and Keefe 1999).
More than 100,000 CWA jobs were lost, and union leadership came to
believe that traditional collective bargaining was limited in its ability to
prevent further job losses. The smaller IBEW presence was also weakened:
all IBEW jobs in some units, such as sales, were lost. The unions were con-
cerned not only about the eﬀects of restructuring on their membership but
about their own institutional security. In 1991, after acquiring NCR, a
company that had aggressively used plant closures and other policies to
avoid unionization, AT&T allowed NCR to go forward with a full range of
antiunion tactics. This occurred simultaneously with discussions AT&T
had begun with CWA about a code of conduct that would commit both the
company and union to nonhostile behaviors during union organizing
drives (Nissen 1998).
On the management side, AT&T came to believe it would be able to com-
pete more successfully if its union relationships were cooperative rather
than adversarial. The company hoped that more cooperative relations with
its unions would help it to expand its market share: unionized workers were
heavily involved in customer service, and the company found it diﬃcult, in
a competitive environment, to gain new business and to retain customers
while engaging in adversarial relationships with these workers and their
representatives.
The partnership model negotiated between AT&T and its unions, the
CWA and the IBEW, known as the Workplace of the Future, was intended
to help all parties move from an adversarial to a more cooperative rela-
tionship. The partnership was kicked oﬀ in March 1993. The agreement
states that “[t]he parties share the goals of establishing a world class, high
performance organization and protecting employment security through
market success,” and recognizes that market success will require the com-
pany to target customer satisfaction and market ﬂexibility (Communica-
tions Workers of America [CWA] 1993, 1). Further, the agreement recog-
nized that “[j]oint training, jointly designed, will be essential to develop
common understandings, describe business strategies, and develop union
expertise in new technology” (CWA 1993, 1).
The partnership structure of the Workplace of the Future had four com-
ponents. Workplace models, to be jointly deﬁned by the company and its
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of workplace practices that enhance quality, customer satisfaction, quality
of work life, and competitiveness. Business Unit/Division Planning Coun-
cils were intended to facilitate participation by the unions in business de-
cisions regarding technology, work organization, job content, training,
employment, and in the development of cooperative work and leadership
styles. The Constructive Relationship Council, established through bar-
gaining in 1989, would continue to function and would facilitate the work
of the Workplace Models and Business Unit/Division Planning Councils.
Finally, a Human Resources Board, consisting of three AT&T executives,
one union leader each from the CWA and the IBEW, and two distinguished
leaders in the ﬁeld of human resources, was established. The Human Re-
source Board was to address “broad, strategic, global human resources
and business issues within the context of the external environment over
long range time frames” (CWA 1993, 1).
The various partnership structures called for in the Workplace of the Fu-
ture agreement have provided the unions and workers with increased op-
portunities for participation, but the record has been uneven. The joint
committees have not met the unions’ expectations. The top-level Human
Resources Board has provided only limited opportunities for union par-
ticipation in strategic decisions. It functions mainly as a means for the
unions to obtain information from AT&T.
The record of the partnership in promoting greater security for the
workforce and for the union has also been mixed. Employment security
language remains weak, and restructuring continues to cause great insecu-
rity for workers. This problem has been especially acute for IBEW; CWA
has had more opportunities to try to save jobs by suggesting alternatives to
the company or to mitigate the eﬀects of downsizing on workers. The com-
pany, however, has not always accepted the unions’ job-saving recommen-
dations.
The partnership has been further strained by the unions’ perception that
AT&T is hostile to the unions’ institutional interests. For example, when
CWA successfully organized a majority of the potential members at AT&T’s
American Transtech to sign union cards, the company backed down on its
neutrality pledge, embarking on an antiunion campaign. The union lost the
1995 representation election. More recently, the company has been buying
into parts of the telecommunications industry that are nonunion and resist-
ing the unions’ attempts to organize these workers. For example, AT&T ac-
quired Tele-Communication, Inc. (TCI) and Media One in order to get into
the cable business, but these acquisitions were not discussed in the partner-
ship. The long-term prospects of the partnership, in CWA’s view, depend
largely on whether AT&T agrees to neutrality when the unions undertake
organizing drives to represent workers in its cable operations.
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In the decade following the 1982 collapse of steel production in the
United States, integrated steel mills were idled, employment fell, and wage
and beneﬁt concessions led to sharp declines in real compensation for
steelworkers. In 1992, the USWA adopted its New Directions bargaining
program, seeking “an ongoing voice for itself and its members in manage-
rial decisions aﬀecting shop-ﬂoor, plant, and corporate performance, all
with an eye toward producing business success suﬃciently sustained and
shared as to serve both company and worker interests on a continuing
basis.” (Frankel 1997, 3). The program, according to USWA President
George Becker, calls for “employment security guarantees and partnership
agreements providing for union and worker involvement at every level from
a seat on the Board of Directors to problem-solving on the shop ﬂoor.”
(Becker 1998, 120).
Building on its 1986 partnership agreement with National Steel, the
USWA introduced New Directions bargaining in the 1993–1994 round of
contract negotiations. The main provisions of the New Directions program
include a no-layoﬀ guarantee; union involvement in workplace and corpo-
rate decision making; restructuring the work place to increase ﬂexibility,
improve productivity, and reduce costs; and neutrality and card check
recognition when the union seeks to organize nonrepresented employees
(Frankel 1997). The program also included a strategic alliance between the
company and the union with respect to public policy and joint company
and union responses to industry trends. The union successfully negotiated
contracts that included these partnership provisions with the major inte-
grated steel companies—Inland, National, Bethlehem, USX, and LTV.
Contracts with other companies, including Wheeling-Pittsburgh, Republic
Engineered Steels, USS/Kobe, Acme, J&L Specialty, Lukens Steel, Gulf
States, and Northwestern Steel and Wire, contained many of the substan-
tive features of the New Directions program. The agreements were for six
years and have been renegotiated since August 1, 1999. Partnership agree-
ments remain an important part of the unions’ bargaining agenda and have
been renegotiated with the major integrated steel companies.
The partnership agreement provides the union with the right to partici-
pate, along with company managers, in decisions at multiple levels. At the
corporate level, joint strategic partnership committees bring union leaders
and company executives together to consider strategic plans, technological
change, staﬃng levels, customer evaluations, major organizational issues,
and facilities utilization. The agreements also include mechanisms by
which union and plant oﬃcials can negotiate over instituting modern work
practices; plant steering committees investigate alternative approaches to
safety, work redesign, work assignments and scheduling, planning for tech-
nological change, training, and process improvement.
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the steel companies to remain neutral when the USWA seeks to organize
their nonrepresented employees and, in most cases, to recognize the union
once a majority of workers has signed union cards. The strength of these
provisions was tested quickly after their adoption: in the 1993–1994 con-
tracts, such provisions covered only those aﬃliates in which the steel com-
pany directly or indirectly owned more than 50 percent of the voting
power. Subsequently, LTV took exactly a 50 percent stake in a minimill in
Gadsden, Alabama—in the union’s view, to evade the neutrality provi-
sions—and the USWA put the partnership it had negotiated with the com-
pany in 1993 on hold. Both workers and the union refused to participate in
problem-solving and decision-making activities. In the 1999 bargaining
round, the neutrality provisions were extended to cover any entity in which
the steel company owns a material interest and whose business involves
steel raw materials or steel production and distribution; LTV agreed to ac-
cept these provisions and to withdraw from its joint venture in the Al-
abama steel mill if its partners refused to remain neutral during a USWA
organizing drive.
The acquiescence of LTV to the neutrality provisions suggests that the
withdrawal of the workers and union from involvement in decision making
and from cooperation in plant committees had consequences for perfor-
mance at LTV’s integrated mills. More generally, Appelbaum and Berg
(2000) report that the partnership program of the USWA played an im-
portant role in increasing the legitimacy of worker involvement on the shop
ﬂoor from the perspectives of both workers and managers, observing that
employment security provisions assure individual workers that they will
not work themselves out of a job if they use their capacities to innovate to
contribute to increased productivity. The new workplace practices, these
authors show, were associated with signiﬁcantly higher productivity and
contributed heavily to the return to proﬁtability of the integrated mills and
to the turnaround in the steel industry.
The extent to which these partnership agreements have been imple-
mented by union and management oﬃcials varies widely as does the extent
to which union oﬃcials participate in strategic decisions at the corporate
level. Some local unions and managers have been able to use the partnership
agreement to engage in mutual-gains bargaining, but other facilities have
experienced resistance from union oﬃcials or local managers to the basic
elements of cooperation and partnership. Both union oﬃcials and man-
agers express skepticism about whether the New Directions partnerships in
steel live up to expectations about union participation in top-level strategic
decisions. But the partnerships have proven valuable to both steel compa-
nies and the USWA as a means to modernize workplace practices, improve
the economic viability of the integrated steel mills and the strength of the
union as an institution, and preserve or expand union jobs in the industry.
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The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAMAW) has successfully launched HPWO partnerships, or is far along
in the process, at approximately ﬁfty (out of several thousand) of the facil-
ities at which it represents workers. Union locals and managers at a far
larger number of work sites have taken early steps toward partnerships.
Partnerships are being developed not only at leading companies such as
Harley Davidson or Weyerhauser, but at smaller companies, often family
owned. The union intends the HPWO Partnerships to enhance employers’
competitive position and thus its members’ job security and welfare. Part-
nerships have been developed with companies that wanted to increase mar-
ket share in the face of intense competition as well as with those facing ﬁ-
nancial problems that pose a threat to their survival.
The IAMAW observes that partnerships must begin with the commit-
ment of management to growth; this commitment enables the union’s par-
ticipation in developing and implementing plans to achieve that growth. In
the view of the union, if all management and the union do “is increase pro-
ductivity and eﬃciency and do not develop strategies to stabilize and grow
the business and get control of costs, employees may improve their way out
of employment” (International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers [IAMAW] 1999, 1).
In addition to growth, the IAMAW has several other aims for its high
performance work organizations. These include agreement on employ-
ment security, development of an education and communication plan for
all employees, and an implementation plan for replacing traditional top-
down decision making by managers with joint decision making by labor
and management at the appropriate levels of the organization. The union
expects to be “recognized as a valued and trusted partner by management.”
At the same time, “the institutional support and protection provided by the
union for the Partnership helps employees accept new roles and explore
new work methods” (IAMAW 1999, 5). The IAMAW thus identiﬁes three
components of a successful partnership: a business plan that incorporates
long-term returns, market expansion, and growth of the workforce; accu-
rate costing-out of the activities that support production of the ﬁrm’s prod-
ucts and services; and changes in the work process that improve quality
and productivity.
Extensive education, training, and planning go into developing partner-
ships. Several years may elapse between the time the union and company
agree to explore a partnership relationship and the time an agreement is
implemented. Partnership agreements establish governance structures to
guide the development of a growth strategy. The corporate partnership
committee at Harley Davidson, for example, comprises four union and two
company representatives. Only after the union and management have
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union agree to assess work processes jointly and to propose improvements.
The introduction of high-performance workplace practices follows, rather
than precedes, the development of the partnership.
Partnership structures also include decision-making bodies at the work-
place, such as business-unit or plant-level teams. These teams determine
appropriate performance measures and guide implementation of new in
work practices. Shop stewards meet daily with their salaried counterparts,
and natural work groups gather and share information, solve problems,
and make daily operational decisions. (IAMAW 1999). To assist its local
unions, the IAMAW also has a ﬁve-person department that provides con-
sulting and training and seven ﬁeld staﬀthat provide support services. Par-
ticularly in smaller companies, top managers have welcomed advice on
business-process improvement and the development of alternative prod-
ucts and workplace practices.
Many of the partnerships have been established in ﬁrms and plants that
have the ineﬃciencies typical of older manufacturing systems. The trying
circumstances have provided a motivation for cooperation but have also
made it diﬃcult to establish trust, develop joint decision making, or to
make fundamental changes in work processes. Obstacles to successful
partnerships include the diﬃculty of taking on new roles for managers,
professionals, other salaried employees, union leaders, and workers. For
example, engineers and supervisors may fear that they have much to lose
from the partnerships and may be reluctant to participate. Further, under
competitive duress, managers experience more pressure to turn to layoﬀs,
and the union may interpret consideration of such options as less than
trustworthy. Shop-ﬂoor frustration with the pace of change or skepticism
about management’s motives can lead to rejection of union leaders or of
contracts that include partnership agreements.
Yet a partnership that provides a commitment by management and the
union to jointly developing a proactive approach to addressing competi-
tive pressures may be the key both to survival for the company and to em-
ployment security for workers. The partnership may also increase the
union’s strength as it comes to be seen by its members as providing real
leadership to ensure the employer’s long-term survival and growth, thereby
preserving jobs.
8.3 Union Representatives on Corporate Boards of Directors
Our reviews and descriptions of partnerships are consistent with the
ﬁnding that fewer than 3 percent of major collective-bargaining agree-
ments feature these arrangements: full partnerships appear to be extremely
diﬃcult for unions to establish and maintain. Negotiated strategic partner-
ships occupy precarious ground. They are vulnerable to collapse where
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vival and eﬀectiveness also depend heavily on management commitment
to the partnership because information sharing and joint decision making
are integral parts of strategic involvement. What is less clear is whether
unions can force such commitment upon management given suﬃcient bar-
gaining power or whether commitment depends in part on the good faith
of management.
Several American unions, aware of the tenuous nature of negotiated
partnerships, have sought to bolster their strategic inﬂuence further by
seeking seats on the boards of directors of companies where they represent
members. Board seats for unions are not necessarily coupled with other
joint approaches or a commitment to partnership in decision making.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, for example, union-nominated director-
ships resulted chieﬂy from negotiations over the institution of Employee
Stock Ownership Plans [ESOPs] (Hunter 1998). In these cases, protection
of the workers’ ownership interests, rather than an increased commitment
to shared strategic decision making, motivated union leaders to seek board
representation. But board seats can be particularly valuable in strategic
partnerships because directorships come with statutory rights to informa-
tion and involvement in decisions. Such seats have emerged as a target of
collective bargaining in programs such as the USWA’s New Directions and
the IAMAW’s HPWO partnerships.
Hunter (1998) identiﬁes three important constraints on union-nominated
directors’ abilities to use the corporate board to represent workers’ in-
terests in strategic decisions. First, union nominees, like all directors on
American corporate boards, are required to represent the interests of share-
holders (for a more complete description of this responsibility, see John-
son, Daily, and Ellstrand 1996), and are legally liable should they fail to 
do so eﬀectively. Their ﬁduciary duties typically proscribe directors from
explicit representation of union interests, except where they can argue 
that meeting such interests is consistent with protecting shareholders’ in-
vestments.
A second constraint on interest representation in the boardroom is nor-
mative: the view of the proper role of corporate boards that pervades
American managerial and directors’ communities. On typical boards, out-
side directors—those not part of the executive team—rarely involve them-
selves with issues of day-to-day governance. Only major events, such as
takeovers or changes in top executives, bring forth outside director ac-
tivism (Useem 1993). Board functioning in less-dramatic circumstances re-
lies on consensus rather than constituency representation or explicit nego-
tiation among competing interests.
Third, managers’ interests are not always aligned with those of the ﬁrms’
shareholders, and managerial opposition to shared control can derail
strategic engagement even when it is to the beneﬁt of shareholders. Here
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board nominees are instructive. Following deregulation and the weakening
of pattern bargaining in the 1980s, trucking companies sought wage con-
cessions. In several ﬁrms, workers accepted stock in return for wage con-
cessions; the IBT insisted on board seats to accompany the stock plans.
Several of the Teamster-nominated directors envisioned these seats as ve-
hicles to foster joint discussion of the strategic issues facing the ﬁrm and
union, but this never developed. Instead, the boards became the venues
through which the IBT attempted to protect its members’ ﬁnancial invest-
ments as the ﬁrms struggled. The managers guarded information closely
and made as many decisions as possible outside the boardroom. Most of
the IBT boards were characterized by considerable mistrust between out-
side directors and inside managers: one Teamster-nominated director ac-
tually sued the managers of his ﬁrm. All of the Teamster board schemes
eventually disappeared as the ﬁrms were acquired or went bankrupt in the
ﬁerce competition that followed deregulation.
Awareness of these legal, normative, and practical constraints has
dimmed union enthusiasm in board representation as a forum for strategic
engagement. Chrysler, for example, was the ﬁrst large American company
to have a union representative on its board, with UAW President Douglas
Fraser obtaining a seat following the concessions associated with Chrysler’s
near bankruptcy in 1980. In 1984, after some wrangling, Fraser’s successor
as president, Owen Bieber, assumed the seat. The Chrysler-UAW experi-
ence illustrated the limits of board representation: both Fraser and Bieber
found it diﬃcult to inﬂuence management policy in this venue. After sev-
eral years, the UAW did not emphasize preservation of the board seat as a
bargaining objective. The corporation restructured its board, dropping
Bieber in 1991.
Nevertheless, experiments with board representation continue. Table 8.1
lists American ﬁrms in which union representatives have recently served on
corporate boards of directors. Typically, these boards have one or more di-
rectors, but fewer than a majority, nominated by a union; the board seats
are written into either the collective-bargaining contract or, where backed
by share ownership, the ESOP agreement. With the exception of the air-
lines, the ﬁrms have directors representing members of only one union; 
airline boards comprise members of both the Airline Pilots Association
(ALPA) and the IAMAW. In addition to the American ﬁrms listed in table
8.1, the UAW is represented on the twenty-person supervisory board of di-
rectors of at the German company Daimler-Chrysler. Under German law,
the unions that represent Daimler-Chrysler workers in Germany are enti-
tled to three seats; the German union IG Metall has allowed a UAW rep-
resentative to assume one of the seats.
Though union oﬃcials (including presidents of international unions
such as Bieber and Fraser) have held directorships, union board represen-
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The IAMAW, for example, discourages active union leaders from serving
on boards; among its representatives are a number of retired union oﬃ-
cials. Another common approach is the nomination of friendly “neu-
trals”—consultants, lawyers, even college professors—to serve as direc-
tors. Some of these union-nominated directors have been eﬀective in
improving ﬁrm governance in the interests of shareholders (Hunter 1998).
Many union-nominated directors have characteristics that, according to
corporate governance theorists, should make directors eﬀective: a strong
interest in the well-being of the company; sources of information; inde-
pendence from management; and ties to important stakeholders (Patton
and Baker 1987). Union nominees with the right skills, commitment, and
support can be as eﬀective contributors to governance as other outside di-
rectors.
A few of the boards of companies in table 8.1 have established them-
selves as forums for strategic partnerships between labor and management.
Most typically, this occurs when the board seats are seen by the parties as
part of a broader approach to labor-management cooperation, and the
parties have strong reasons for cooperation rooted in the demands of the
competitive market. Wever’s (1989) case study of the Western Airlines
board, for example, showed that board participation was stronger when ac-
companied by further forms of employee involvement and that all these
forms of involvement were stronger when unions were more powerful and
secure. As with other partnerships, the institutional security of the union
and the perception of the union that management will not (or is not pow-
erful enough to) undermine that security are important prerequisites for
success.
Union-nominated directors have had inﬂuence on strategic decision
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Wheeling Pittsburghmaking in a number of areas. Cagy, experienced directors can use norms of
consensus to stall or delay decisions by withholding approval, for example.
Union-nominated directors may discourage managers from implementing
plans that will be perceived by the unions as divisive or destructive. Typi-
cally, they can do so by using their board positions to raise issues for dis-
cussion and by requiring managers to address the argument that plans that
provoke union opposition may be bad for the company (and its sharehold-
ers) in the long term.
Directors also aﬀect the selection and compensation of top executives.
Union nominees can push to hire managers who are relatively more com-
mitted to partnership and to protecting the institutional interests of the
union, for example, and may be able to stall or block the appointments of
managers that they believe would be hostile. Directors can also ensure that
executive pay packages are established (and explained to the workforce) in
ways consistent with the preservation of partnership rather than in ways
that breed distrust or discontent.
Board representatives can also be helpful in preserving a role for collec-
tive bargaining while placing it in strategic context. The presence of union
representatives on corporate boards can help each side make its position
credible to the other: books are relatively more open, for example, and di-
rectors can establish additional channels for communication.
While board representation can facilitate aspects of partnership, such as
information sharing, it is clear that such representation provides no guar-
antees that the parties will work together to address joint concerns amica-
bly. In addition to the diﬃculties at Chrysler and the problems the Team-
sters had, there have been other well-publicized ﬁascos with union board
seats. At the Rath Packing Company, the boardroom became yet another
locus of destructive labor-management conﬂict (Hammer and Stern 1986),
with the union eventually calling a strike against the ﬁrm its members
owned. At Hyatt-Clark, similarly, the boardroom featured ﬁerce battles
over the distribution of wages and dividends (“Hyatt-Clark ESOP” 1985).
At Eastern Airlines, labor-management battles raged even as the company
plummeted into bankruptcy (Smaby 1988).
United Airlines provides a recent example of the challenges that union-
nominated directorships face. The ALPA and the IAMAW obtained one
seat each on the board of directors, along with share ownership, in 1994.
(The ﬂight attendants did not join in the plan, though nonunion employees
also took partial ownership and one board seat.) Directors struggled to es-
tablish their roles. The union nominees owed ﬁduciary responsibilities to all
shareholders. Yet they owed their seats, and their loyalties, to the unions
that had nominated them. On the board, directors formally represented em-
ployees’ ownership interests. In practice, the distinction between these in-
terests; the interests of employees in their jobs, wages, and working condi-
tions; and the interests of the unions as institutions tended to get tangled up.
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a catalyst for further cooperative approaches to labor-management rela-
tions. Over time, the likelihood that an eﬀective partnership would be es-
tablished diminished as trust between top managers and the unions eroded.
A diﬃcult round of bargaining in 1997 was followed by a dispute over the
IAMAW’s organizing of passenger service agents. An on again–oﬀ again
proposal for a merger with USAirways provided further controversy. Even-
tually, the diﬃculties in the relationship began to have detrimental eﬀects
on company performance. In summer 2000 pilots were accused of engag-
ing in work slowdowns (the pilots’ spokesmen denied the accusations), and
the 2001 round of bargaining between United and the IAMAW was bitter
even by industry standards. The airline’s performance did not improve rel-
ative to its competitors after the buyout (Gittell, von Nordenﬂycht, and
Kochan 2004), and none of the parties saw the ESOP as a success story.
8.3.1 Dilemmas for Unions
In the United States, it seems unlikely that managers or public policy will
act to establish joint participation. Thus strategic partnerships will depend
primarily on union initiatives. We therefore turn next to the dilemmas that
such partnerships pose for unions and consider the ways in which unions
have addressed these challenges.
Unions have brought three diﬀerent orientations to strategic partner-
ships. First, where workers have invested in the ﬁrm through stock pur-
chases and ESOPs, unions can negotiate for ways to monitor managers
more carefully from an investor’s point of view. Second, partnerships can
be defensive, focused on company growth or stability and on the preserva-
tion of union jobs. Third, the partnership may be part of an overall attempt
by the union to involve itself more deeply in the management of the ﬁrm in
which the union and its members seek to deploy their expertise to promote
ﬁrm performance.
Strategic participation from any orientation, whether exercised through
negotiated partnerships or through board seats, raises diﬃcult challenges
for unions. Problems with participation at the local level are relatively well
understood (Frost 2000): the commitment of local representatives to labor-
management participation enhances their chances for success, but such
commitment requires local unionists to redeﬁne their roles and to convince
their members of the value associated with cooperation (Kochan 1985). At
the strategic level, the stakes are high. Issues taken up at the strategic level
aﬀect job security and the survival of the ﬁrm and the union. Historically,
union leaders have been averse to accepting even partial responsibility for
managerial decisions. They remain skeptical that partnerships will provide
true inﬂuence, believing that managers are not willing to share decision-
making authority. Successful strategic partnerships therefore require unions
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be forced to engage in partnership.
To gain workers’ support, strategic partnerships must protect not only
workers’ investments but also the institutional security of the union itself.
American managers enjoy considerable freedom to oppose workers’ right
to organize and to move work from union to nonunion settings through
outsourcing or investment strategies. This aspect of U.S. industrial rela-
tions shapes union leaders’ reactions to partnerships. On the one hand, be-
cause union leaders are centrally concerned with preserving union jobs,
they have incentives to seek a variety of strategies, including partnerships,
that might be eﬀective in doing so. On the other hand, continued attention
to institutional security on the part of the union leaders can distract from
other issues that might be considered jointly. The ability of managers to
walk away from labor-management relationships, and, in some cases, their
demonstrated willingness to do so, can erode the mutual trust necessary to
make partnerships eﬀective.
Union leaders are likely to see any purported beneﬁts of partnership as
vacuous in the presence of threats to the continued vitality of labor repre-
sentation for the ﬁrms’ workers. One promising area for further research is
the relationship between union organizing and strategic partnerships.
Through strategic partnerships, unions have sought to establish conditions
of neutrality toward further organizing and toward treatment of acquisi-
tions. Where partnerships have ﬂoundered, on the other hand, it is often
because the unions have been unable to forge this kind of arrangement.
Keeping union jobs inside the ﬁrm rather than outsourcing them may be a
similar precondition for success.
Even where the parties have enough common interests to warrant coop-
eration, further factors also mitigate against the success of strategic part-
nerships. Eﬀectiveness of strategic partnerships can be greatly enhanced by
the support and involvement of the broader union. International unions
have more resources to train and guide local leaders, and they can provide
directors and local leaders in partnerships with information and expert ad-
vice. International unions, however, are also charged with setting industry
frameworks for bargaining and with the establishment of common stan-
dards and principles. This creates problems for the international with re-
spect to strategic participation. As one union leader remarked,
When I talk about a conﬂict of interest I’m not really talking about the
simple union-management problem. The issue is really single enterprise
loyalty. I don’t want me or the [international] union to be in a position of
playing God, to be picking winners in the industry. (Hunter 1998, 564)
Strategic engagement and partnerships confront competitive issues in
which decisions that help one ﬁrm may harm another. A dilemma for in-
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ships that will enable them to avoid being caught up in such intraindustry
competition. Internationals, and hence partnerships, are more likely to be
eﬀective where circumstances permit the partnership to focus on competi-
tive challenges that do not raise such internal problems for the union (for
example, attacking the nonunion sector in electrical contracting).
Successful partnerships require the commitment of substantial union re-
sources, both to the achievement of the partnership (because management
is often opposed) and to its support and maintenance. With the beneﬁts 
of strategic engagement unclear, unions may be reluctant to provide the
required levels of support; few unions besides the USWA, IAMAW, and
ALPA, for example, have identiﬁed strategic partnerships as an objective
of collective bargaining, and the USWA is currently reassessing the promi-
nence it has assigned to this goal. Within the CWA, similarly, the future of
partnerships is being debated, with skeptics questioning the commitment
of union resources to participation at the expense of activities such as or-
ganizing.
Union-management strategic partnerships also may exclude from the
discussion parties that are necessary to the long-term success of the ﬁrm
(Heckscher and Shurman 1997). For example, inside the ﬁrm, middle man-
agers and supervisors go unrepresented, yet their reactions strongly aﬀect
the success of strategic initiatives or the introduction of new work systems.
Further, partnerships must be matched to the appropriate level of organi-
zational decision making: corporate-level partnerships may be ineﬀectual
in a highly decentralized management structure, for example, while eﬀec-
tive division- or plant-level partnerships may be undone with a single deci-
sion made at corporate headquarters.
Table 8.2 brings together in summary form a range of choices available
to unions in the design of these institutions. The choices union leaders
make will depend on a number of factors: internal union politics and struc-
ture; the particular features of the competitive markets in which the ﬁrms
seek to compete (the extent of unionization, global competition, or com-
petition on the basis of price, for example); the bargaining power of the
union at the local and international levels; and the relationship and history
union leaders have with local and corporate-level management.
8.4 Concluding Remarks
Few ﬁrms have actively sought the involvement of union leaders in stra-
tegic decisions. Rather, the construction of these forums has required
unusual circumstances, strong common interests in surviving in diﬃcult com-
petitive environments, and determined union leadership. Nor have strate-
gic partnerships in the United States evolved naturally from other kinds of
partnerships or employee involvement programs. Though managers will



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































?continue to seek performance advantages from employee involvement in
the workplace, they seem less likely to invite unions into the executive suite
or other arenas for strategic partnership.
The primary rationale for union-management partnerships is to pro-
mote the long-term competitive position of the ﬁrm in directions consis-
tent with protection of the workers’ investments in the ﬁrm, whether in ﬁ-
nancial or in human capital. In some environments, the parties may not
have enough common interests to make partnership viable. As Heckscher
and Shurman (1997) note, a potentially “fatal problem” with partnerships
is that they cannot address the turbulence outside the ﬁrm that seems to be
endemic to the current economy.
Management opposition to partnerships may derive from the calcula-
tion that the beneﬁts from cooperation are outweighed by the potential
costs. There is a self-reinforcing quality to this calculation: the less coop-
erative the relationship between labor and management, the more likely it
is that the parties will not be able to discover or realize joint gains. Nor is
it clear that opposition is purely economic. In the absence of clear evidence
of advantages, managers may oppose shared control for ideological rea-
sons or believe that partnerships reﬂect poorly on their ability to manage.
A further consideration is that American labor laws provide relatively
weak protection of workers’ rights to organize. Even in unionized ﬁrms,
managers typically oppose vigorously any attempts to extend union repre-
sentation and seek opportunities to move work from union to nonunion
environments. Preserving this ability to oppose unionization also provides
another reason for managers’ reluctance to purse partnership. Union in-
volvement in strategic decision making tends, on the other hand, to be con-
centrated heavily on preserving membership. In the absence of such secu-
rity, union leaders ﬁnd it diﬃcult to engage in the kinds of cooperation that
would permit the parties to confront the kinds of threats to employees’ job
security and earnings that could be addressed by joint eﬀorts such as those
directed toward training or the implementation of high-performance work
practices.
More generally, public policy developments that would mandate, or
even encourage, strategic partnerships between unions and management
also seem exceedingly unlikely. In fact, American unions now confront the
issue of strategic participation in a legal environment that ﬁts union-
management partnerships poorly. Little legal guidance exists on how part-
nerships should be conducted even where the parties ﬁnd ways to establish
them—on the extent to which union leaders might compromise their duty
of fair representation to their members in the exercise of their ﬁduciary du-
ties as board directors, for example, or how they might reconcile duties of
representation with decisions made in the process of strategic planning.
Directors also enjoy little legal guidance on the extent to which they are al-
lowed to share information with the unions that nominate them to boards.
288 Eileen Appelbaum and Larry W. HunterManagement lawyers tend to advise union nominees to share nothing,
which is hardly consistent with the spirit of the arrangements. Antitrust
law governing interlocking directorates is also vague in its application to
these contexts and with respect to whether international unions can send
representatives to multiple ﬁrms. Further, the extent to which conﬂicts of
interest require union-nominated directors to remove themselves from
discussions is debatable both in theory and practice. Several boards have
considered, with diﬀerent results, whether the presence of the union repre-
sentatives in the boardroom is appropriate during discussions of collective-
bargaining strategy. Negotiated partnerships, while less burdened by legal
requirements than are directorships, operate in a legal vacuum. The fur-
ther emergence of both these forms of partnership should be considered in
the surrounding legal context, and changes in that context merit close at-
tention for those interested in strategic participation.
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